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ABSTRACT
Integrated river basin management (IRBM) is an approach that has been interpreted in a number of different ways during the last 100 years. Current
support for IRBM is based on a ‘myth’ of inter-agency co-ordination. However, increasing complexity and uncertainty in river basin systems has
created ‘wicked’ or ‘messy’ land and water management problems. The limited capacity of state institutions to deal effectively with such conditions
suggests that the current ‘myth’ must be reformed and that a more powerful system-response capability founded on inter-organisational collaboration
should be developed. The case for a collaborative institutional approach to IRBM is examined with reference to the Fraser Basin Council in British
Columbia, Canada.
Keywords: Integrated river basin management; complexity; uncertainty; inter-organisational collaboration; Fraser Basin Council;
CARIBOO model.
1 Introduction
If integrated river basin management (IRBM) is understood to
mean co-ordinated planning, development, management and use
of land, water and related natural resources within hydrologic
boundaries, then clearly it is not a new idea. However, it is only in
the last few years that international support for an integrated man-
agement approach has gathered momentum (Born and Sonzogni,
1995). A key turning point was reached in 1992 when the so-
called Dublin Principles for water management were developed
and Agenda 21 was published following the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit)
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Young et al., 1994). A decade later,
the Plan for Implementation arising from the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) called for the development of
national and regional strategies for IRBM founded on a partner-
ship approach and use of the full range of regulatory, economic
and voluntary instruments (United Nations Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, 2002; Salman, 2004). Also during
this period, new organisations such as the World Water Council
(WWC) and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) urged govern-
ments to pursue a more integrated approach to the management
of land, water and related resources.
Despite extensive support for the concept, practical appli-
cation of IRBM has remained problematic (Margerum and
Hooper, 2001). One factor behind this ‘implementation gap’
is the shear complexity of managing the open and dynamic
socio-biophysical systems contained within river basin bound-
aries. In addition, institutional factors are among the most
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formidable barriers inhibiting the transition of IRBM from policy
into practice (Ingram et al., 1984; White, 1998). Specifi-
cally, IRBM has been widely interpreted as an approach that
can be achieved though improved co-ordination among plan-
ning and management organisations without any fundamental
reforms to existing institutional arrangements and systems of
governance for land and water. However, it is argued here that
improved co-ordination alone will not be enough. In the types
of conditions that prevail today, the success of IRBM is ulti-
mately dependent on ‘collaborative capital’ (Beyerlein et al.,
2003) or ‘collaborative advantage’ (Huxham, 1996). As such,
researchers and practitioners should shift their attention from
co-ordination strategies to the design and implementation of
more collaborative approaches for decision-making and problem
solving.
This paper is organised in the following way. First, changes
in the interpretation of IRBM are briefly reviewed and the
limitations of co-ordination as an implementation strategy are
examined. Attention is then turned to the need for collaboration
in IRBM and the particular advantages that might be gained by
adopting this approach. This is followed by an examination of the
process of collaboration, drawing on literature from the field of
public management and administration, which has received rel-
atively little scrutiny from researchers interested in river basin
management. The paper then addresses the question of how
a collaborative approach for IRBM might be organised, using
the example of the Fraser Basin Council in British Columbia,
Canada. Finally, conclusions, lessons and implications for IRBM
research and practice are presented.
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2 Integrated river basin management
Although unified, holistic or integrated management of water,
land and other natural resources within the boundaries of river
basins and watersheds has attracted widespread support from pol-
icy makers, managers and academics, it is a concept that has
proved difficult to translate into operational terms (Downs et al.,
1991; White, 1998; Margerum, 1999a). Mitchell (1990) argued
that implementation has been hindered by confusion over defini-
tions and meanings. The literature on the subject refers to IRBM
as a normative ideal (what should be done), as a strategic policy
(what can be done) and also as an operational approach (what will
be done). Furthermore, IRBM can be applied to the management
of the different elements of the water system, to the land and water
systems, or to the broader environmental, social and economic
systems within a river basin. It is not surprising in these cir-
cumstances that little agreement appears to have emerged among
researchers and practitioners beyond a very basic definition of
IRBM.
As an early form of integrated management, comprehensive
development of water resources within the hydrologic limits of
an entire river basin gained credence in several countries during
the first half of the 20th century. Perhaps the best-known example
of IRBM from this early period is the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity (TVA) in the United States (Stewart and Tolbert, 1993; Miller
et al., 1996). The TVA was created during the New Deal era
to plan and develop available natural resources in a comprehen-
sive fashion and to improve economic and social conditions in
what was, at that time, one of the poorest regions of the coun-
try. The TVA linked environmental, economic and social policy
together and established the principle that water management
should be used as a means to an end, and should not simply be
viewed purely as an end in its own right. Furthermore, the TVA
reflected the belief that integrated water resources management
could be achieved by creating multi-functional bureaucracies.
Although the precise TVA institutional model was not replicated,
a similar philosophy and approach was adopted in several other
countries. For example, beginning in the 1940s, the provin-
cial government of the Province of Ontario in Canada actively
encouraged municipalities to jointly create watershed-based Con-
servation Authorities with wide ranging responsibilities for the
planning, development and management of water, land, timber
and other renewable natural resources. Today, the Ontario Con-
servation Authorities are internationally recognized as leading
examples of an integrated approach to watershed management.
According to Mitchell and Shrubsole (1992), their success is
based on six key principles: the watershed as the management
unit, local initiative, provincial-municipal partnership, a healthy
environment for a healthy economy, a comprehensive approach,
and co-operation and co-ordination. Nevertheless, the efficacy of
some of the CAs has been reduced in recent years due to budgetary
restrictions and the emergence of other government organiza-
tions with overlapping responsibilities and powers (Shrubsole,
1996).
As many western countries experienced rapid economic and
population growth during the 1950s and 1960s, IRBM was
transformed to take account of a shift in societal values and
objectives. Comprehensive resource development was replaced
by a concern for unified resource management aimed at reconcil-
ing competing demands and avoiding water-use conflicts. This
revised approach to IRBM was exemplified by the institutional
arrangements created in England and Wales during the 1960s and
1970s (Parker and Sewell, 1988). In essence, responsibility for
water management was progressively removed from the control
of local governments and other public organisations whose juris-
dictions were defined by political and administrative, rather than
hydrologic, boundaries. In their place, new all-purpose water
management authorities were created with control over the full
range of substantive functions (water supply, waste disposal,
flood control etc.) and generic functions (planning, develop-
ment, regulation etc.) within entire river basins. Although the
approach was considered revolutionary at the time, it was not
entirely successful because each authority was responsible for
regulatory and operational aspects of water management, which
led to weak enforcement of water quality standards. Similar insti-
tutional strategies were deployed in the United States, where
a series of commissions with responsibilities for water alloca-
tion, regulation and other functions such as watershed planning
were established for inter-state river basins. However, the few
commissions that survive today have limited powers and other
government organisations operating within each river basin are
often not obliged to support or follow their decisions (Loucks,
2003).
During the 1970s and 1980s, a number of governments
invested heavily in the production of comprehensive river basin
development and management plans. For example, Mitchell
(1983) described how such plans were generated for major river
basins across Canada so that available water resources could be
used to their full potential. However, the planning exercise had
only limited success because the desire to examine every aspect of
each river basin created enormous data requirements, the plans
themselves took too long to complete, and circumstances had
often changed by the time each plan was published.
Experiences in the USA, the UK and Canada suggest that
whilst the objectives of water management had changed some-
what by the late 1970s, governments continued to subscribe to
the idea that IRBM could be achieved through a bureaucratic
and largely government-led institutional approach. This domi-
nant interpretation of IRBM was challenged in the early 1980s
in two important respects. First, an important difference between
a comprehensive approach and an integrated approach to river
basin management was recognised (Mitchell, 1990). Whilst the
former requires consideration and management of all the dif-
ferent elements and processes within a water resources system,
the latter focuses only on the interactions among elements that
are significant in a particular river basin. For example, in one
river basin the relationship between pollution and declining fish
stocks may be of critical importance, whereas in another the
key concern may be related to water abstraction for domestic
or industrial use. As such, IRBM in its most recent form is a
more focused approach that may enable some of the concep-
tual, analytical and managerial challenges associated with the
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more comprehensive interpretation to be avoided. Second, many
governments recognised that IRBM implied the management of
both the land and water components of river basins and that the
predominantly ‘water-centric’ view of the past was inappropri-
ate. For example, several state governments in Australia adopted
policies for Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) or Total
Catchment Management (TCM) (Mitchell and Hollick, 1993;
Johnson et al., 1996; Margerum, 1999b; Bellamy and Johnson,
2000; Hillman et al., 2003).
Clearly, IRBM has been defined, conceptualised and imple-
mented in a number of different ways during the last eighty years.
Nevertheless, throughout this entire period IRBM has continued
to be founded on a ‘myth’of inter-agency coordination. The term
‘myth’ is used here to describe an idea, principle or belief that
is so widely accepted that it becomes part of the doctrine of
an entire professional community. Dorcey (1987, p. 17) made
the following observation regarding the importance of myths for
water management:
“Myths are one of the symbols that humans create when faced with
uncertainty and chaos to reduce ambiguity, resolve confusion, increase
predictability and provide direction. Unfortunately, however, while
they help us cope, they can also blind us to new information and
opportunities to learn.”
Many organisations, policy makers and researchers continue
to subscribe to the myth that improved co-ordination is the key to
the successful practice of IRBM. For example, the Global Water
Partnership (2001, p. 1) stated:
“IWRM is a process which promotes the coordinated development and
management of water, land and related resources in order to maximise
the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner
without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.”
For clarification, co-ordination is as an arrangement whereby
two or more organisations or units create and/or use existing deci-
sion rules in order to align their separate policies, programmes
or practices (Mulford and Rogers, 1982). As such, a formal,
rigid and rule-based relationship is implied which enables organ-
isations to assist each other in working towards their separate
objectives. Whilst improved co-ordination can reduce to some
extent problems of fragmentation, overlap and duplication in
river basin management, co-ordination alone does not represent
an adequate institutional strategy for IRBM. The case against
the myth of inter-agency co-ordination is based on arguments
about the nature of river basin systems, the types of river basin
issues and problems that prevail at the present time and the capac-
ity of state institutions to cope in such conditions. In the last
twenty years, the conventional view of river basins as closed
ecological systems characterised by stability and predictability
has gradually been eroded. An alternative perspective has started
to emerge in the literature, which portrays river basins as unsta-
ble, open and chaotic socio-biophysical systems, giving rise to
‘wicked’or ‘messy’management problems characterised by com-
plexity, change, uncertainty and conflict (Holling, 1978; Kay and
Schneider, 1994). For example, diffuse pollution from agricul-
ture, the impacts of climate change on human and non-human
uses of rivers, the loss of wetlands and biodiversity, increas-
ing risks of flood and drought, and conflict over water rights
in fully appropriated river basins are commonly experienced in
many parts of the world. This type of intractable problem tran-
scends the interests and jurisdictions of numerous government
and non-government groups operating in different policy are-
nas, at different scales and with different understandings, values,
attitudes and beliefs regarding the use and management of land
and water. In these sorts of circumstances, both the ‘ends’ and
the ‘means’ of management are uncertain, effective solutions are
beyond the reach of any single agency or organisation and pro-
ducing agreement over causes, consequences and management
responses for the problem is extremely difficult (Trist, 1980;
Christensen, 1985).
The legitimacy of traditional state institutions is being chal-
lenged by a number of other changes in addition to the emergence
of intractable and multi-faceted societal problems (Kooiman,
1993; Glasbergen, 1998; Pierre, 2000; Lovan et al., 2004). For
instance, governments no longer appear to occupy a supreme
position in policy processes because of a gradual ‘hollowing-out’
of state institutions and a re-distribution of responsibilities among
complex networks of private and new ‘third-sector’organisations
(Rhodes, 2000; Taylor and Warburton, 2003). This process has
been driven by pragmatic concerns, such as reduced public sec-
tor budgets, and also ideological beliefs regarding the need for
a more differentiated set of instruments to deliver public policy
and the perils of ‘big government’. Additionally, governments
and their agencies are increasingly concerned with establishing
broad frameworks for action (steering) and are progressively less
involved in actual policy development and implementation (row-
ing). As a result of these various changes, the conventional idea
of ‘government’ is being gradually replaced by ‘governance’ to
reflect the proliferation of coalitions or partnerships of public, pri-
vate and voluntary organisations with responsibilities for many
different policy areas, including health, education, urban regen-
eration and environmental protection (Lowndes and Skelcher,
1998; O’Riordan, 2004).
The limited capacity of state institutions to cope with complex
and messy problems implies that co-ordination (and particularly
inter-governmental and inter-agency co-ordination) cannot pro-
vide the kind of system-response capability that is required for
IRBM. Although co-ordination is still required, it does not fit
the present operating environment and is an out-dated strategy.
As Connick and Innes (2003) argued, it is time to rethink our
worldview when our norms, concepts, and expectations offer a
poor match for reality. In short, it is time to reform the myth of
inter-agency co-ordination in IRBM.
3 A case for collaboration
If inter-organisational co-ordination is not sufficient, then clearly
it is important to identify an alternative concept as a ‘myth’ for
IRBM. The law of requisite variety states that a system’s survival
is threatened when the response repertoire cannot match the vari-
ety emanating from the environment (Ashby, 1960). The impli-
cation is that institutional arrangements and responses for IRBM
must reflect the complex, uncertain, dynamic, inter-connected,
246 Nigel Watson
open and adaptive characteristics of the river basin systems them-
selves. Today’s turbulent conditions and intractable river basin
management problems demand innovative and dynamic insti-
tutional responses, which government institutions acting alone
cannot hope to provide.
There is an extensive research literature on the use of collab-
oration to address pressing societal problems (for example, Gray
1985, 1989; Mattesich and Monsey, 1992; Alter and Hage, 1993;
Huxham, 1996). Whilst academics and practitioners interested in
resource and environmental policy have shown increasing inter-
est in this type of approach (for example, Selin and Chavez,
1995; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000), collaboration has received
only limited attention from those specifically interested in river
basin management. Gray (1985, p. 912) provided one of the most
widely used definitions of collaboration:
“By collaboration we mean: (1) the pooling of appreciations and/or
tangible resources, e.g., information, money labor, etc., (2) by two or
more stakeholders, (3) to solve a set of problems which neither can
solve individually.”
Clearly, collaboration extends the level of interaction well
beyond co-ordination. At the inter-organisational level, collabo-
ration gives explicit recognition to the different interests, values,
attitudes, preferences and capabilities within a plural society.
These differences can be used in a constructive way to tackle
shared problems by developing common understandings and joint
commitments for action among the stakeholders. Collaborative
governance can be seen as an extension of the approaches and
methods developed in the field of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion (ADR) during the last twenty years (Glasbergen, 1995).
A ‘principled approach’ is central to the success of both ADR
and collaborative governance. Many attempts at negotiation fail
because the disputing parties adopt adversarial and inflexible
stances. In contrast, the prospects for mutually beneficial agree-
ment and joint action are greatly improved when principled
negotiation is used, which requires all of the disputants to: sep-
arate the people from the problem, focus on interests and not
positions, invent options for mutual gain and insist on explicit
criteria to guide decisions (Fisher and Ury, 1981).
The collaborative governance model appears to offer a number
of potential benefits for IRBM, which conventional bureaucratic
or even highly co-ordinated institutional arrangements cannot
provide. By creating a more richly joined policy process, collab-
oration provides a mechanism to deal with ‘edge and boundary
problems’ where the powers, duties, jurisdictions and interests
of several organisations and groups overlap (Mitchell, 1990).
Huxham and Macdonald (1992) identified four such ‘pitfalls of
individualism’: repetition, omission, divergence and counter-
production, all of which they believe can be reduced through
effective collaboration. Other significant benefits can be derived
from the enhanced role of non-state parties in the policy process.
Whilst the practice of public consultation is well established in
river basin management, collaboration provides non-government
groups with opportunities to participate in decision making in a
more direct and meaningful way (McKinney, 1988). In addition
to satisfying ideological demands for openness and direct public
engagement, several other benefits for IRBM may also be gained
from collaboration. Because collaboration involves the sharing
of power, a greater degree of flexibility is provided for designing
policy processes to fit particular circumstances. Valuable infor-
mation, knowledge or practical resources which lie outside the
realms of scientists and managers may enable problems to be
defined more clearly, alternatives or more sophisticated manage-
ment options to be developed and potential policy choices to
be assessed more carefully. Thus, by improving the quality of
the decision-making process, collaboration reduces the risks of
dispute and implementation failure later in the policy cycle. Fur-
thermore, stakeholders are more likely to accept costs or agree
to changes in their behaviour if they have played a direct role in
shaping the policy.
4 The process of collaboration
Inter-organisational collaboration appears to offer a suitable
foundation for IRBM. Nevertheless, a valid management ‘myth’
must be capable of practical application. It is important, there-
fore to consider how inter-organisational collaboration works in
practice. In attempting to develop a realistic understanding of
collaboration, a variety of models have been developed which
describe the various phases of interaction during the process (for
example, McCann, 1983; Gray, 1985; Selin and Chavez, 1995;
Hudson et al., 1999). The conceptual framework illustrated in
Figure 1 draws together various aspects of these models. Col-
laboration is portrayed here as an emergent and iterative process
rather than a highly structured and linear arrangement. How a
particular collaborative initiative develops over time is a func-
tion of both external pressures and the dynamics of the inter- and
intra-organisational relationships themselves. Nevertheless, four
key phases of collaboration are identified: problem setting, direc-
tion setting, structuring, and outputs and outcomes. Attempts at
collaborative problem solving may involve several repetitions of
this cycle and the length of time devoted to each phase will vary
from case to case. Equally, obstacles or disagreements may be
encountered at any point in the process which may require the
participants to re-visit earlier phases in order to re-define or re-
organise their joint activities and arrangements. The framework
also emphasizes the fact that collaboration does not operate in
Figure 1 A conceptual framework for collaboration.
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isolation and that prevailing economic, political, social, and envi-
ronmental conditions will be significant influences. The different
elements within the conceptual framework are described below.
4.1 Contextual conditions
Hudson et al. (1999) argued that an overly optimistic and naïve
view characterises much of the literature on collaboration. It has
widely been assumed that organisations will readily collaborate in
order to jointly address an issue or problem that affects their com-
mon interests. In practice, decisions to pursue collaboration, or
indeed to reject approaches from other organisations, are likely to
be triggered by a wide variety of changes in contextual conditions.
Weiss (1987) suggested that an organisation’s motive for collab-
oration may be capacity-driven or commitment-driven. In the
former case, collaboration is seen as a mechanism for furthering
the organisation’s own interests by accessing additional resources
or gaining political influence over other groups. This may be
particularly relevant where an organisation faces an uncertain
future and must therefore associate itself with powerful allies in
order to survive. In contrast, an organisation that is commitment-
driven is motivated by a desire to work with other groups or
interests in order to address a shared problem. In practice, the
actual level of commitment is likely to vary among different
groups and organisations. For example, two organisations with
shared responsibilities for river basin management may have a
genuine commitment to collaboration because of a common con-
cern about a water quality or quantity issue. On the other hand,
collaboration may be legally mandated or imposed by officials or
leaders at more senior levels upon organisations which otherwise
would not choose to engage with one another because of fears
about loss of power, authority, resources or territory. The impli-
cation for IRBM is that collaboration is unlikely to be a smooth
or conflict-free process and sustained negotiation and facilitation
will be needed in order to keep the interested parties on board.
4.2 Problem setting
Not withstanding the potential obstacles outlined above, prob-
lem setting represents the first phase of collaboration. According
to McCann (1983), this phase in the process is concerned with
establishing the identity of the problem and the legitimate stake-
holders who occupy the problem domain. In the context of IRBM,
the stakeholders should collectively address key questions such
as ‘what is the current state of the river basin system’, ‘who
is affected and in what ways’, and ‘is the current state less
than desirable’? As such, various claims made by river basin
organisations and groups are legitimised and social recognition
of the problem’s existence is developed. Through joint research,
conferences, workshops and other meetings, a common under-
standing of the nature of the problem emerges and stakeholders in
the river basin begin to appreciate their interdependence. Arriving
at such a common understanding is not always easy. Information
is likely to be incomplete, evidence open to interpretation and
the claims of various stakeholders are likely to be contested. This
initial phase of collaboration has a fundamental bearing on the
success of the whole collaborative process yet, in practice, rarely
receives sufficient attention. As Bardwell (1991) observed, jump-
ing to conclusions without examining the nature of problems in
sufficient depth means that 90% of our efforts in resource and
environmental management are spent solving the wrong prob-
lem, stating the problem in a way so that it can be solved, solving
a solution, stating a problem too generally, or trying to get agree-
ment on the solution before there is agreement on the problem.
Insufficient exploration and appreciation of river basin manage-
ment problems during this initial phase of collaboration is likely
to undermine subsequent phases in the process and therefore
repeated attempts at establishing the identity of the problem may
therefore be required. Conversely, successful problem setting can
help to strengthen links among disparate groups and to engage
organisations that previously resisted collaboration, or sought to
use it purely for their own ends.
4.3 Direction setting
Having established a common understanding of key river basin
management problems, attention should shift towards the identi-
fication of desirable future conditions and a direction for action. A
key issue for negotiation and a potential obstacle during this phase
of collaboration is ‘ends legitimacy’. In order to gain legitimacy
and support, super-ordinate goals must reflect the desires and
aspirations of the collaborating organisations, be feasible, and
also must be deemed worthwhile by society at large (McCann,
1983). A hypothetical example from river basin management is
provided here to illustrate the point. A wildlife conservation
organisation and an angling association jointly agree that the
development of a world-class salmon fishery is a desirable long-
term goal for a particular river. However, such a goal will only
be considered legitimate if it is judged to be feasible (in both
technical and economic terms) and if government agencies and
other powerful organisations perceive sufficient value in the pro-
posed actions to justify the allocation of limited resources. Whilst
direction setting is an important aspect of collaboration, it is clear
that in practice the establishment of long-term goals and actions
is unlikely to be straightforward due to different understand-
ings, values, attitudes, and aspirations among the collaborating
organisations and groups in the policy arena.
4.4 Structuring
Assuming that attempts to assess current conditions and to define
a more favourable alternative for the future have at least been
partially successful, inter-organisational structures and proce-
dures must be created to guide subsequent collective action. In
effect, the previously loosely negotiated understandings must
be formalised through a set of arrangements designed to allo-
cate roles and responsibilities and to regulate interactions among
the collaborators (Gray, 1985). According to McCann (1983),
this structuring phase of collaboration is often poorly handled.
Explicit mechanisms for equitably negotiating roles and respon-
sibilities are often missing and there is a tendency to rely on
bureaucratic management principles. Consequently, roles may
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be poorly matched to capabilities and insufficient consideration
may be given to alternative structures such as networks, coali-
tions and partnership arrangements. Failure to develop adequate
structural arrangements for the inter-organisational environment
has major implications, since the collaborators will not be able
to move forward in the desired direction.
4.5 Outputs and outcomes
Much of the research literature on collaboration identifies struc-
turing as the last phase in the process. However, collaboration
should be viewed as a means to an end, and not as an end in itself.
By working through the first three phases of collaboration, organ-
isations should be able to develop joint policies, programmes and
projects (outputs) designed to produce outcomes, which are con-
sistent with established long-term goals and ambitions (Selin and
Chavez, 1995). Failure to generate outputs or to achieve positive
outcomes is likely to undermine the commitment of participants
to the collaborative arrangement.
The preceding account demonstrates that, in practice, collab-
oration is a complex and fragile process. Potential obstacles and
barriers exist during each phase of interaction and there is always
the danger that the collaborative arrangement becomes a prob-
lem in its own right rather than a solution. Clearly, collaboration
should not be treated as a panacea or ‘silver bullet’ for IRBM
even though it does appear to offer significant advantages.
5 Organising for collaboration
The viability of inter-organisational collaboration as a myth for
IRBM clearly depends on how well the process itself is managed.
Case studies of innovative approaches to IRBM can provide some
useful insights regarding the desirable institutional conditions
and management arrangements required for collaboration to suc-
ceed. Attention is focussed here on the Fraser Basin Council
(FBC), British Columbia, Canada. The FBC was established in
1997 with the purpose of facilitating sustainable development
through collaborative decision making and action involving four
orders of government plus economic, social and environmental
interests from different parts of the Basin. The analysis is struc-
tured according to the framework outlined in Figure 1. Research
evidence was gathered over a four-year period (2000–2004) from
a mix of data sources, including face-to-face interviews and an
e-mail survey involving twenty-four FBC Directors, staff and
third-party representatives, documents produced by the FBC and
government agencies, published research literature and site visits.
5.1 Contextual conditions
The Fraser Basin occupies an area of approximately 234,000 km2
(equal to the UK) and drains 25% of the province of British
Columbia on the west coast of Canada (Figure 2). Comprising
of fourteen separate watersheds, the Fraser supports a popula-
tion of more than 2.5 million people. Key economic activities
include timber production, agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing
and financial services, which collectively account for 80% of the
Gross Provincial Product (GPP) and 10% of Canada’s GDP. In
the 10,000 years prior to the arrival of European settlers, salmon
and other natural resources in the Basin supported an indigenous
population of approximately 50,000. However, mining, timber
harvesting, agricultural settlement, port development and urban
expansion from the early 1800s onwards impaired environmen-
tal quality and produced a catalogue of land and water-related
problems (Healey et al., 1999). Prior to the 1970s, responses to
these problems were largely piecemeal and focussed on singular
functions such as flood control, port development, fisheries and
water pollution control.
Contextual conditions began to shift in favour of a more inte-
grated approach in the late 1970s because of rapid economic
growth affecting the Fraser estuary and controversial propos-
als for the expansion of Vancouver International Airport in the
delta area (Dorcey, 1986). The Fraser River Estuary Manage-
ment Program (FREMP) was established in 1985 in order to
improve co-ordination among the activities of federal depart-
ments, provincial ministries, municipal authorities, harbour
commissions and other groups with jurisdiction in the estuary
(Hanna, 1999). Nevertheless, the benefits of FREMP were lim-
ited to tidal waters and the surrounding land area of the Greater
Vancouver Regional District. By the early 1990s, a number of
policy shifts at the national level had generated increasing inter-
est in basin-wide planning and management from government
and non-government groups. Under the Green Plan, the federal
government announced the Fraser River Action Plan (FRAP) in
1991, which provided $100 million (Canadian) for the reduc-
tion of pollution, restoration of habitats and regeneration of fish
stocks. Between 1992 and 1994, the Canadian Water Resources
Association (CWRA) developed a set of sustainability principles
for water management in Canada, which emphasized the need for
integrated watershed management, consensus through negotia-
tion and active public participation in decision-making (Mitchell
and Shrubsole, 1994). Developments at the provincial level, such
as the establishment of the BC Round Table on Environment and
Economy and increasing attention to the rights of indigenous
people by the courts and governments, helped to further build up
momentum for institutional reform in the Fraser Basin (Dorcey,
1997).
The responses of many of the research participants suggested
that the shift towards IRBM in the Fraser was not simply the
result of a universal commitment to the principles of sustainable
development. Representatives for different organisations indi-
cated their interest in collaborative forms of decision-making was
also motivated by a number of factors. For example, participants
from federal government departments argued that involvement
with the FBC enabled initiatives to be undertaken that might oth-
erwise be controversial or invite suspicion if undertaken solely
by government. In contrast, others were supportive of the FBC
because it provided opportunities for local government, First
Nations and environmental groups to directly participate in policy
processes. Thus, support for the establishment of the FBC devel-
oped over a period of twenty years but gathered pace in the early
1990s. Some of the changes were directly related to the emerging
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Figure 2 The Fraser Basin, British Columbia, Canada.
concept of sustainable development, whilst others were related
to the individual concerns and requirements of government and
non-government groups within the Fraser Basin. Collectively,
these different factors triggered a process of institutional reform
and innovation.
5.2 Problem setting
In August 1991, the Canadian federal government proposed an
initiative to pursue IRBM in the Fraser Basin. Officials recog-
nised from the start that this ambitious initiative would require
a collaborative approach involving a wide range of government
and non-government groups. A Start-Up Committee was created,
which included representatives for federal, provincial and local
government, First Nations, environmental groups, industry and
general public interests. Establishing a common understanding
of the problems and the obstacles for sustainable development
in the Fraser was a significant challenge during this phase of the
process. As Dorcey (1997, p. 185) observed:
“While the civil servants were familiar with the administrative
processes of government, this was not the case for many of the
non-government members. Although individuals knew parts of the
basin where they had lived and worked, no member was well
acquainted with all its vastness. Each of the non-aboriginal members
had a great deal to learn about the First Nations in the basin.”
The Start-Up Committee produced the ‘Agreement Respecting
the Fraser Basin Management Program’, which was signed and
endorsed by federal and provincial ministers plus representatives
for local government in 1992. This agreement was significant
because it paved the way for the creation of a multi-stakeholder
Fraser Basin Management Board (FBMB), which was charged
with developing a collaborative programme of action for sustain-
able development in the regions, communities and watersheds of
the Basin. Between 1992 and 1997, the FBMB undertook a wide
range of activities, such as extensive public consultations, for-
mation of stakeholder committees, audits of water management
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activities such as flood control, selecting demonstration projects
and also produced State of the Basin (SoB) reports. Each activity
was designed to advance understanding of the Fraser Basin itself
and to identify changes in policy and practice required to achieve
sustainable development through IRBM. As such, significant
progress had been made in developing a common appreciation
among the stakeholders of the different aspects of sustainable
development and the challenges to be faced in the Fraser Basin
by the time the Agreement expired in 1997. Many of the intervie-
wees acknowledged the valuable work completed by the FBMB
and several argued that the subsequent creation of the FBC would
not have been possible without this initial phase of collaboration.
5.3 Direction setting
Whilst the FBMB was initially concerned with improving under-
standing of existing conditions and problems, attention was
turned after 1996 to the development of a long-term vision for
the Fraser and principles to guide decision-making and policy
Figure 3 Sustainability principles for the Fraser Basin.
implementation. One of the final acts of the FBMB was to
prepare a Charter for Sustainability. Although not a legally bind-
ing document, the Charter articulates the economic, social and
environmental characteristics of a sustainable Fraser Basin and
outlines twelve guiding principles (Figure 3). The vision itself
carries a broad, ambitious and aspiring message about the need
to link economic development with social and environmental
considerations.
In addition, the Charter explicitly acknowledges the need to
strengthen institutional arrangements. Some of the key institu-
tional requirements identified include the adoption of natural
watershed boundaries, collective and cooperative approaches,
participation of indigenous people, plus inclusive, transparent
and accountable decision making at the local level. A large major-
ity of interviewees and respondents agreed that the Charter is a
vital ‘living’ document that is sufficiently inclusive in tone and
content to command support from a diverse set of government
and non-government interests throughout the Basin. Whilst there
were different views regarding the particular issues and problems
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to be resolved in the Basin, there was broad agreement that an
approach based on collaboration and consensus, as reflected in
the Charter, offers the best prospects for progress. Thus, the FBC
was fortunate to avoid many of the challenges associated with
direction setting by inheriting a common vision and a series of
agreed principles to guide action from the FRMB.
5.4 Structuring
The FBMB had a total of nineteen members, including rep-
resentatives for federal and provincial government (6), local
governments (6) and First Nations (3). The remaining positions
include a neutral Chair plus six knowledgeable individuals who
were appointed by the federal, provincial and local government
signatories of the agreement establishing the FRMB. According
to Dorcey (1997), a former Chair of the FBMB, this arrangement
had three fundamental limitations. First, members of the Board
were not fully accountable to their constituencies because of a
lack of transparent reporting mechanisms. Second, the FBMB
suffered due to a lack of independence from government. In some
instances, effectiveness was reduced due to resistance from gov-
ernment organisations to the idea of collaboration and power
sharing. In others, the credibility of the FBMB was damaged
by what was seen as undue governmental control. Thirdly, the
Board only received half ($1.5 million Canadian) of the annual
budget deemed necessary to deliver the ambitious mandate. To
address these concerns, the FBC was established as a successor
organisation with the purpose of promoting sustainable develop-
ment by bringing together the four orders of government (federal,
Figure 4 The structure of the Fraser Basin Council.
provincial, local and First Nations) and representatives for eco-
nomic, social and environmental interests from all parts of the
Basin. The Council was conceived as an impartial and non-
partisan facilitator of change that would operate on the basis of
consensus achieved through open dialogue, negotiation, conflict
resolution and raised public awareness. The FBC is a not-for-
profit (charitable) organisation, recognised under the Society Act
of Canada, and seeks to broker agreement for action and not to
duplicate the functions of the various government agencies with
responsibilities for the management of the Fraser.
Figure 4 illustrates the organisational structure of the FBC,
which includes a number of important features designed to
promote collaboration for IRBM. Equitable representation and
power among government and non-government participants is
crucial in IRBM because issues cut across different jurisdic-
tions and many different perspectives and interests must be
considered. The FBC itself includes 36 directors who represent
federal and provincial government (6), eight regional districts
that include 60 local governments in the Basin (8), the eight
First Nations language groups (8), sectoral interests from the
five geographic sub-regions which make up the Basin (10),
basin-wide social, economic and environmental interests (3)
and a neutral Chair (1). The four orders of government make
their own appointments to the FBC and, together, those Direc-
tors are responsible for the selection of individuals to represent
basin-wide and sectoral interests. Directors from federal govern-
ment report to a satellite committee (Federal Caucus) of eleven
federal department representatives and an identical arrange-
ment exists for Directors from provincial government ministries
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(Provincial Caucus). Local government representatives report to
their Regional districts and to the Union of BC Municipalities.
Research participants from a broad range of backgrounds con-
sidered representation and power to be balanced and fair within
the FBC, and argued that the structure was a significant improve-
ment upon the arrangements that had existed for the FBMB.
Several people also placed a high value on the independence of
the FBC and argued that an organisation of this type must not be
perceived to be simply part of existing bureaucratic arrangements
or controlled by government groups. The majority of partici-
pants felt that the arrangements had enabled the FBC to maintain
independence, whilst at the same time providing a forum for
decision-making outside the normal government channels. Sev-
eral people also argued that the neutral Chair played a crucial
role in facilitating negotiation and ensuring that the principles
outlined in the Charter for Sustainability were adhered to.
Participants also recognised that representation for First
Nations interests is a particularly difficult issue that cannot be
easily resolved. The eight First Nations language groups in the
Fraser Basin include 96 separate Bands that are regarded as sep-
arate kinship groups by indigenous people. Because each band
is a distinct social and administrative system, the eight First
Nations Directors are unable to speak on behalf of them all,
although each director does provide a unique perspective and
a vital link between aboriginal and non-aboriginal orders of gov-
ernment. An added complication is that some Bands within the
same language groups are divided regarding the negotiation of
treaties and land claims with the federal and provincial gov-
ernments. Bands that are unwilling to negotiate under present
conditions are reluctant to participate in initiatives such as the
FBC, which include other orders of government. The FBC has
recognised the importance of the 11th principle outlined in the
Charter for Sustainability and in February 2004 approved an
action plan for building and improving aboriginal and non-
aboriginal relations (Fraser Basin Council, 2004). The purpose
of the Plan is to promote understanding of aboriginal issues
and how aboriginal title and rights are linked to sustainabil-
ity. In addition, the Plan seeks to develop joint solutions to
sustainability issues that are shared by aboriginal and non-
aboriginal communities in the Fraser Basin. Specific planned
actions for 2004–05 include the publication of a reference doc-
ument describing the history of First Nations in the Basin, key
court decisions, challenges and opportunities to apply the 11th
principle and lessons learned to date. In addition, the FBC
intends to identify a number of positive examples from the Basin
that demonstrate effective collaboration among aboriginal and
non-aboriginal groups.
For effective IRBM, institutional arrangements must be flex-
ible and adaptable in order to respond sensitively to changes
in knowledge, circumstances and needs. Adaptive capacity is
particularly important for the management of the Fraser basin,
which is an extremely large geographical area and includes com-
plex bio-physical and socio-economic systems that are subject
to fluctuation and change. Autopoietic capacity, or the ability
for self-learning, is an essential attribute for organisations oper-
ating under such conditions which can be enhanced through
heterarchical rather than hierarchical institutional structures
(Mulvihill and Keith, 1989; McLain and Lee, 1996; Kooiman,
1993).
The FBC has created a number of arrangements designed to
promote self-organisation, social learning and adaptation. The
operation of five Regional Committees is a key feature of these
arrangements (Figure 4). The five regions are amalgamations
of major watersheds in the Basin. FBC Directors from each
of the regions form the Regional Committees, with member-
ship varying from four to seven to reflect the number of local
government, First Nations and sectoral interests. Directors rep-
resenting basin-wide, federal and provincial government interests
do not participate at this level. Full-time Co-ordinators were
introduced in each region by the FBC from 1998 onwards, and
each Regional Committee has developed a style of operation
to reflect pertinent issues and the circumstances of the Direc-
tors. For example, the Thompson Regional Committee meets on
a regular basis and has concentrated on key local issues such
as promoting stewardship of fishery resources, assisting with
the development of settlement strategies, raising public aware-
ness of water quality problems in Shuswap Lake and working
to provide broadband internet communications for aboriginal
and non-aboriginal communities in the Fraser Canyon. In con-
trast, the Fraser valley Regional Committee tends not to meet
frequently but the Co-ordinator does regularly consult with indi-
vidual Directors regarding a range of environmental and social
initiatives. Government and non-government respondents were
in strong agreement that the network of Regional Committees
had provided a valuable bottom-up or grass-roots mechanism
for identifying sustainability issues that have local, regional or
even-basin-wide implications, for raising awareness and for tak-
ing action that is consistent with the principles outlined in the
Charter for Sustainability.
The three meetings of the full FBC held each year have also
been used to promote organisational learning and adaptation.
Since 1999, the first day of the June meeting has been devoted to
a field trip. Visits to key sites have raised awareness of significant
problems and challenges and have also enabled FBC staff to
demonstrate how the Charter for Sustainability relates to on-the-
ground issues. Unfortunately, it was reported that attendance
by Directors holding senior government positions was gener-
ally poor on these trips. Since 2000, one of the three meetings
each year has been held at a location outside Vancouver. Many
interviewees stated that, despite the extra costs, the field trips
and the meetings outside Vancouver were extremely useful for
exposing directors and staff to unfamiliar issues and alternative
perspectives from different parts of the Basin.
As part of the structuring process, agreement must be reached
regarding how funding for collaborative action will be gen-
erated and how those resources will be allocated. Whilst the
provision of adequate human and financial resources does not
guarantee effective collaboration, an absence of these elements
is likely to seriously undermine efforts. Funding arrangements
are a particularly distinctive feature of the FBC, with federal,
provincial and local governments contributing in almost equal
measure. In 2002/03, local government provided approximately
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Cdn. $330,000 to the FBC, with seven of the eight Regional Dis-
tricts contributing at a rate of 20 cents per head of population. The
eighth Regional District (GreaterVancouver) contributed at a rate
of ten cents per head because an equal amount is also provided
to support the Fraser Estuary Management Program (FREMP).
Nevertheless, the difference in rate is significant for the FBC as
the Greater Vancouver area supports some 1.7 million people, or
nearly 70% of the total basin population. The local government
contribution is matched by funds from two ministries (Ministry of
Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, and the Ministry
of Sustainable Resource Management) and four federal depart-
ments (Department of Environment, Department of Fisheries and
Oceans, Department of Transport, and Department of Western
Economic Diversification).
In 2000, senior staff members and some of the Directors raised
a number of issues regarding funding for the FBC, which at the
time was approximately Cdn. $ 1 million per year. A majority
accepted that First Nations groups could not contribute finan-
cially to the FBC at that time due to the political and economic
circumstances of indigenous groups. Whilst Cdn. $ 1 million/year
was considered adequate for the basic administrative and opera-
tional functions of the FBC, it was argued that additional funding
was required to support sustainability initiatives throughout the
Basin. There was agreement among interviewees that federal,
provincial and local government were unlikely to increase the
size of their annual contributions and therefore additional funds
would have to be generated from either private sector donations
or fee-for-service projects and activities. Indeed, the then Chair
of the FBC suggested that the total contribution from government
would have to be matched by funding from other sources if the
initiative was to continue beyond the first five years of operation.
In 1998–99, project income was approximately Cdn. $100,000,
but had increased to Cdn. $720,000 by 2002–03 (Fraser Basin
Council, 2003). As such, the FBC has made significant progress
and is close to a situation where government funding is matched
by income from other sources. Overall, total income increased
from around Cdn. $ 1 million in 1998–99 to almost Cdn. $
2 million in 2002–03. Approximately 40% of the budget is allo-
cated to basin-wide programmes, 20% to regional programmes,
20% to administration, 10% to communications and 10% to
Board operations (Fraser Basin Council, 2003).
5.5 Outputs and outcomes
Although problem setting, direction setting and structuring are
all important aspects of effective collaboration, actual results and
impacts are usually considered the most important indicators of
performance. Unless ‘collaborative advantage’ (Huxham, 1996)
can be demonstrated, the commitment of partnering organiza-
tions in terms of both political and financial support is unlikely
to be maintained. Maintaining commitment for collaboration is
particularly important in the context of IRBM, since a transition
to a balanced and sustainable pattern of resource use may only
occur over several decades and numerous obstacles are likely to
be encountered along the way. Thus, in order to maintain sup-
port, collaborative institutions must be able to demonstrate that a
range products and services, or outputs, has been delivered. Ide-
ally, the outcomes arising from the products and services should
also be measured in order to indicate progress towards the goals
and objectives established during the direction-setting phase.
In the case of the FBC, a wide range of basin-wide and regional
initiatives has been developed. For example, at the basin scale
the FBC has played a key role in facilitating in the develop-
ment of collaborative strategies for flood hazard management,
sustainable fisheries, invasive plant species and economic diversi-
fication in rural areas. In addition, the FBC operates the provincial
information exchange on climate change and the Executive Direc-
tor has served as Chairperson for an independent review panel
examining proposed provincial legislation for the protection of
drinking water supplies. The FBC also convenes biennial State
of the Basin conferences and offers sustainability awards, which
recognise outstanding contributions in five areas of sustainability:
improving understanding, caring for ecosystems, strengthening
communities and improving decision making.
In 2000, a number of interviewees expressed concern about
the concentration of FBC regional initiatives in the lower basin,
where population and associated development problems are most
evident. It was suggested by Directors from the middle and upper
basin that the perceived imbalances in the distribution of benefits
might cause funding from some of the Regional Districts to be
discontinued. However, responses from research participants in
2004 indicated that the imbalance had been corrected and that
each Regional Committee had a number of projects designed to
address prominent economic, social and environmental concerns
in particular watersheds. By acting as a facilitator and media-
tor at the regional and local level, the FBC has contributed to
the resolution of a number of long-standing controversies and
environmental disputes. A prime example is the Nechako water-
shed in the Upper Fraser region. The Nechako has been the
focus of legal and political disputes since the construction of
the Kenney Dam and Kemano hydroelectric project in the 1950s
to enable aluminium smelting at Kitimat (Day and Quinn, 1992).
Deeper controversy was caused by a proposal for the Kemano
Completion project (KCP) in the 1980s that involved the diver-
sion of more water from the Nechako watershed. The KCP was
eventually cancelled in 1995 after several legal challenges and the
provincial government and the Aluminium Company of Canada
(Alcan) signed an agreement in 1997 to deal with outstanding
water rights. Part of the agreement provides up to Cdn. $100
million towards the Nechako Environmental Enhancement Fund
(NEEF), which is to be used to mitigate the effects of the dam
and water diversions. The FBC has played a pivotal role in devel-
oping a multi-stakeholder process to consider how the needs and
interests of different groups might be met through various envi-
ronmental enhancement options, including the construction of
a cold-water release facility at the Kenney Dam. Specifically,
the FBC assisted in the establishment of the Nechako Watershed
Council (NWC) in June 1988. The NWC works towards the coop-
erative resolution of water management issues and is supported by
the FBC Coordinator for the Upper Fraser region. The NWC itself
includes representatives for business (including Alcan), com-
munity interests and municipal, regional, provincial and First
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Nations government and has worked to resolve twenty-six spe-
cific watershed management issues. The NWC also produced
recommendations regarding the design of a cold-water release
facility for the Kenney Dam, which were accepted by the sig-
natories of the NEEF agreement in 2001. Since 2001, the NWC
has produced an implementation plan for the cold-water release
facility and has examined the potential impacts of alternative flow
regimes after construction.
The importance of monitoring and evaluating outcomes and
environmental change in relation to long-term management goals
has also been recognised by the FBC.As set of indicators has been
developed by the FBC to track trends over time with respect
to population, health, education, housing, community engage-
ment, aboriginal and non-aboriginal relationships, water quality,
air quality, fish and wildlife, income and employment, eco-
nomic diversification, corporate social responsibility, forests and
forestry, agriculture, energy and river flooding. The indicators
were used to produce a report entitled A Snapshot of Sustainabil-
ity, which identified areas where significant progress had been
made, where conditions were deteriorating and where there was
insufficient evidence to determine change (Fraser Basin Council,
2003). As such, the indicators provide a valuable tool for assess-
ing conditions and trends, examining the impacts of policies and
identifying areas where additional efforts are required.
6 Conclusions
IRBM is currently founded on a myth of inter-organisational co-
ordination. In other words, it is widely assumed that the institu-
tional obstacles that so often prevent the practical implementation
of IRBM can be overcome by improving co-ordination among
the various agencies and other organisations with responsibilities
for the management of land and water resources. However,
improved co-ordination is an inappropriate institutional response
for IRBM in the turbulent and messy types of conditions,
which are becoming increasingly common in many parts of the
world. Co-ordination certainly can help to overcome problems
of administrative fragmentation, but alone it does not provide
the necessary institutional capacity to deal with land and water
management problems characterised by complexity, change,
uncertainty and conflict. As such, the myth of inter-organisational
co-ordination in IRBM needs to be reformed.
In contrast to co-ordination, inter-organisational collabora-
tion provides a dynamic, open-ended and interactive approach to
IRBM. The adoption of a myth of inter-organisational collabo-
ration would offer two key advantages for IRBM. First, simply
by accepting the need for a collaborative approach, the com-
plex nature of river basin systems and the uncertainty regarding
both the means and ends of river basin management would be
more explicitly acknowledged. Second, a collaborative system
of governance involving both government and non-government
interests would enable turbulent conditions and wicked manage-
ment problems to be dealt with in a more efficient, effective
and equitable manner. In principle, collaboration would enable
issues and problems to be collectively defined, directions and
desired futures to be articulated and management responses to
be organised. However, it is also evident that in practice inter-
organisational collaboration itself can be difficult and therefore
should not be treated as a panacea or ‘silver bullet’ for IRBM.
The success of any collaborative approach to IRBM ultimately
depends on the design of the institutional arrangements and
the ability of participants to reach consensus through effective
negotiation.
Experiences in the Fraser Basin provide some valuable
insights regarding the key institutional conditions and arrange-
ments that are required for a collaborative approach to IRBM
to succeed. These key features or design principles are identi-
fied by the acronym ‘CARIBOO’ (Figure 5). A Common vision
is a key requirement for effective collaboration because differ-
ences in needs, values and expectations are likely to exist among
government and non-government organisations with interests in
land and water management. In the case of the Fraser Basin,
a common vision is presented in the Charter for Sustainabil-
ity, which articulates the agreed long-term management goals,
the major sustainability challenges to be addressed and manage-
rial principles to guide action. The Charter provides strategic
direction and is also used at the operational level to ensure that
initiatives are consistent with the agreed vision and principles.
Collaborative institutions for IRBM also require Adaptive capac-
ity to cope with changes in circumstances and knowledge. The
heterarchical organisational structure of the Fraser Basin Coun-
cil has enabled discretion and adaptability to be maintained at
the regional level whilst also providing cohesion among the four
orders of government. The organisation of FBC annual meetings
is also innovative, providing opportunities for organisational and
social learning through information exchange and exposure to
ideas and perspectives from different parts of the Basin. Effective
collaboration also requires Resources, since additional efforts
and costs are involved. The shared funding arrangements for the
FBC provide an effective platform for collaboration, whilst spe-
cific projects and initiatives have been funded from additional
government and non-government sources. By 2004, the FBC has
reached a situation whereby core funding from government was
matched by project-related income.
Figure 5 The CARIBOO partnership model.
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The experience of the FBC also suggests that Independence
from government institutions is also a crucial factor. The FBC is
not an attempt to replace or duplicate the functions of existing
government organisations involved in land and water manage-
ment. Rather, the FBC is a third-party facilitator designed to deal
with multi-jurisdictional issues that governments themselves can-
not easily deal with. Indeed, support has been sustained over time
because the FBC performs a facilitation role rather than function-
ing as a fifth order of government which may have threatened
the authority or power of public officials and their organisations.
A collaborative approach to IRBM also depends on Balance in
terms of representation and power. The fact that the FBC is a
not-for-profit charity that is beyond direct government control
is significant in this respect. Furthermore, the consensus-based
approach to decision making that is used by the FBC ensures
that powerful coalitions cannot out-vote minority interests. The
FBC provides balanced representation from different geographi-
cal regions within the Fraser Basin and recognizes First Nations as
a legitimate order of government. Finally, Outputs and Outcomes
must be produced, because collaboration is a means to and
end and not an end in itself. The FBC has generated a wide
range of outputs related to economic, social and environmental
concerns at the basin and regional scales. Additionally, sustain-
ability indicators and State of the Basin reporting mechanisms
have been developed so that outcomes can be monitored and
progress towards sustainable development in the Fraser Basin
can be assessed.
At the present time, the sort of institutional approach devel-
oped by the FBC is an exception rather than the norm for IRBM.
Whilst there are significant advantages and benefits associated
with collaboration, wider application of this approach will require
substantial changes in organisational cultures and professional
attitudes in the fields of water, environmental and river basin
management. Society appears to be faced with an increasing
number of critical water and land management problems char-
acterised by ignorance and indeterminacy. In these conditions,
the limitations of expert opinions are quickly exposed and the
resource planner or manager has to assume a new role as a medi-
ator among diverse groups with different values, opinions and
expectations. In today’s turbulent environment, so-called ‘soft’
management skills such as negotiation, mediation and facilitation
are as important as technical and engineering knowledge. One of
the most important implications to emerge from this conclusion
is that universities and other academic institutions have an obliga-
tion to ensure that graduates appreciate the value of collaborative
capital and are fully equipped with the necessary managerial and
inter-personal skills needed to turn the myth of collaboration into
a reality for integrated river basin management.
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